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2Inefficiencies caused by Governments’ interventions in airlines’ markets
ABSTRACT 
At least seven of the indicators of market inefficiencies and/or failure are visible 
in the airline industry.   These have been triggered by national, multi-national or 
supranational governments’ (NMSGs’) interventions trying to resolve political, 
social or environmental problems.  These seven interventions (many lacking 
preliminary economic analysis) have been aimed at resolving lack of 
competition, filling missing markets, and neutralising the presence of negative 
externalities, free riders, social inequalities and moral panic.  Desk research 
showed that just one of these NMSGs’ interventions was beneficial since it 
encouraged competition while the other six unintentionally triggered market 
inefficiencies or failures.  Furthermore, it is possible that some of the 
interventions could eventually make advanced world airlines subsidise their 
advancing world competitors.  
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1 INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC PROVISION AND PRIVATE 
MARKETS
Sometimes Governments’ market interventions work to the detriment of an 
industry.  Consequently and unfortunately, much Government intervention in 
markets – the space where buyers and suppliers meet – triggers imperfect 
working, inflates costs and creates distortions (Coase, 1988).   To support their 
interventions, Governments write laws however, the economic function of law is 
not to prevent all harm but to minimise costs or maximise benefits (Veljanovski, 
2006).    This intention is sometimes lost when national, multi-national and 
supranational governments (NMSGs) or their institutions focus on political, social 
or environmental aims and ignore the economics which are fundamental to 
market functions.
Markets are not always free to behave as they would wish and are adjusted by 
producers supplying, consumers purchasing and by NMSG regulators intervening 
to ensure that trade functions as intended.   Efficient markets try to produce a 
general equilibrium where supply and demand are in balance and where what is 
produced from fully-used resources is completely consumed.    However, market 
inefficiency or failure can result in oversupply or undersupply.     Inefficient (or 
failing) markets have multiple theories to describe their underlying conditions.  
Using desk research, seven theories are examined in Section 2 and in Section 3 
they are matched to NMSGs’ interventions in the airline industry.   The potential 
of the theories to restrain international airline competition is covered in Section 
4.   
32 SEVEN THEORIES OF ALLEGED MARKET 
INEFFICIENCY OR FAILURE
2.1 Lack of competition
Lack of competition can lead to market inefficiency or failure.   It occurs in many 
ways including where there are few suppliers (oligopolists) selling homogenous 
products or a single supplier (monopolist) supplying a product with no close 
substitutes.   Both could block new entrants into their markets and set their own 
prices – activities which are detrimental for consumers.   Any industry which 
lacks competition could also have high barriers to market entry due to 
regulations or excessive costs.    Furthermore, lack of competition can lead to a 
concentration of firms which governments might feel obliged to break up in order 
to give the consumers more choice and free the market.    Barriers to market 
entry also include high start-up and other costs caused by government 
intervention (including industry regulations or special tax advantages awarded to 
existing firms).  Further costs can be incurred where governments own the 
business and wish to maintain the status quo.  Contestable markets encourage 
entrepreneurs with their product and service innovations, competitive pricing 
and lower costs – all of which benefit consumers (Doganis, 2010).   
2.2 Missing markets
 ‘Missing’ markets occur where no real market for the products or services has 
previously existed usually because no one has recognised that a market is 
needed.  These markets are often in aspects of life which are taken for granted 
and assumed to continue into perpetuity such as landscape views, silence, public 
broadcasts, light from lighthouses, air quality, the Courts system and global 
positioning signals (Graves, 2013).    However, when identified, these ‘missing’ 
markets become eligible to have property rights ascribed.  These establish legal 
ownership which enables trading to commence.    Furthermore, markets can only 
function if they have clear ownership of contents otherwise there would be 
continual disputes and trade would be impossible.     When NMSGs discover a 
‘missing’ market which would benefit their citizenry, they can intervene by 
regulating, taxing, issuing permits, requiring compensatory payments or 
mandating provisions on privately-owned organisations to supply (the latter 
amounts to confiscation of property).   Once a market has been discovered, its 
continuance can depend on the State or on competitive forces to keep it filled. 
2.3 Externalities
Externalities are those issues which are the unintended consequences of an 
economic activity for which the costs and benefits were not considered with the 
production decision.   The presence of externalities is not always perceived as a 
sign of market failure but rather could indicate a ‘missing’ market which can be 
identified by assigning well-defined, enforceable, tradeable property rights 
(Coase, 1960).    Externalities can be positive (when the social benefits exceed 
the private benefits such as the light from a lighthouse guarding ocean rocks) or 
negative (when the private costs are less than the social costs such as when 
noise from one aeroplane disturbs the sleep of an entire neighbourhood).   
Negative externalities can result “in non-optimal levels of private goods 
production and consumption” (Graves, 2013) and because the real costs of 
production are not charged to consumers there can be overproduction (an 
indication of economic inefficiency).   Under-production or over-production leads 
to inefficient resource allocation.    The greater are the externalities, the greater 
is the likelihood of market inefficiency or failure.
42.4 Free riders
A free rider is “a person or firm that uses a good for free while it has been 
provided to others at a cost. In this way, the other users have the incentive to 
act likewise and thus not pay. Free riders take advantage of the non-
excludability of public goods making it inefficient for a private supplier to make 
them available. In this way, public goods are a cause of market failure directly 
because of free-riders.”   (Prentice and Prokop, 2015: 289).    Once a good or 
service is provided, then non-excludability means that no one can be forced to 
pay for consumption or that the cost of enforcing the payment is too high to 
justify the pursuit i.e. the ‘free rider’ problem (Samuelson, 1954).    Because free 
riders who receive the benefit from provision have no incentive to pay for it, the 
market underprovides.  In fact, individuals can increase their personal welfare by 
not paying for the goods or services.     Even though demand can be high, free 
goods are under produced or not produced at all and the lack of revenue from 
those who wish to consume without paying means that the private market 
cannot support production (Ancell, 2017).
2.5 Government provision
If NMSGs feel that markets will not provide the goods or services they believe are 
necessary for their citizens, the State can provide them as public goods and 
services (using taxpayer provided funds).  Alternatively the State could subsidise 
them to provide a market or regulate them in which case taxpayers will fund.   
Public goods are non-rivalrous (i.e. one person’s consumption does not affect 
another’s) and non-excludable (i.e. nonpayers are not excluded) (Samuelson, 
1954).  In contrast, private goods and services are excludable and rivalrous: one 
person’s consumption prevents another from consuming.    The non-excludability 
of pure public goods explains why such goods are not profitable for 
entrepreneurs to supply privately (Graves, 2013).   Public goods are often 
overused because what is considered to be ‘free’ is often not valued especially 
by those who have not contributed to the provision i.e. ‘free riders’.   
Furthermore “economic theory holds that public goods, such as national security, 
cannot be delivered efficiently by free market forces because of the free-rider 
problem” (Prentice, 2015: 52).  
2.6 Inequalities
Social inequalities can take many forms including reduced opportunities, income 
and consumption.    This can mean that some consumers access fewer goods 
and services than others because they sustain higher base expenditure or 
reduced income.   Where Governments believe that universal provision is in the 
interests of the nation they will legislate by either providing what they consider 
necessary (i.e. public goods) or by subsidising the facilities, programmes or even 
the consumers directly so that consumption is not based only on the ability to 
pay.   Included in these provisions are free State-provided education, public 
vaccination programmes and health care which, in the United Kingdom (UK), is 
provided by the free-at-point-of-use National Health Service (NHS) (Ancell, 2017).  
2.7 Moral panic
‘Moral panic’ describes the exaggerated fear of a social phenomenon despite a 
lack of evidence.  “Moral panics have to create, focus on and sustain powerfully 
persuasive images of folk devils that can serve as the heart of moral fears” (Ben-
Yehuda, 2009: 1-2).    They are characterised by “…speeches, sermons, 
preaching, negotiations, arguments, debates, legislation, law enforcement 
priorities, agenda setting and the like, all focussed on moral issues” (ibid: 2).  
Such issues are whipped up by the media as presenting a threat to society which 
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regulation.  In turn this leads to a chain reaction with a disproportionate effect on 
a wider population (Ancell, 2017).    
3 DISCUSSION
3.1 Lack of competition
Around the 1970s, when many governments recognised that they could no 
longer afford the costs of their growing aviation industry, they liberated it 
thereby eliminating the State support needed to invest and develop the services.   
In doing so they unleashed the power of the market (Doganis, 2010).  This led to 
the democratisation of air travel and the creation of new industries through the 
outsourcing of many formerly in-house activities such as aircraft washing, 
fuelling and catering.    Deregulation freed the airlines to compete 
internationally, forge new markets and develop innovative operating models the 
most notable of which were the low-cost carriers (Williams and Baláz, 2009).  
Their entrepreneurs offered consumers “higher frequencies on existing or new 
routes, new point-to-point connections and cheaper fares” (ibid: 681).  This was a 
major welfare improvement often linking previously unconnected or poorly 
connected regions as well as providing services to “major and secondary airports 
in the leading economic regions.” (ibid: 682).   This NMSG intervention was 
socially and economically beneficial to the industry and to its consumers. 
3.2 Missing markets 
Governments have supported the identification of many formerly missing airline 
markets and used many of the tools in the economic tool kit to do so.  These 
include regulating (as is now applied to airline security and air traffic control), 
taxing (as exampled by the UK’s Air Passenger Duty (APD), issuing permits (such 
as those required for waste disposal), requiring compensatory payments to cover 
negative externalities (often used to regulate aircraft emissions and noise) and 
mandating provisions (such as those provided for the assistance of passengers 
with reduced mobility (PRMs)).    Missing market ‘corrections’ are often covered 
by unfunded mandates and boondoggles (i.e. wasteful projects which will 
continue because of vested, asymmetrical (partisan), political and economic 
influences (Ancell, 2017)).   Both of these options are tantamount to confiscation 
of shareholder’s dividends and/or employee’s rewards.  They could also place 
additional costs on passengers. 
Any proposal should be appraised in terms of costs and benefits as well as 
strengths and weaknesses.    However, one of the problems with government 
mandating has often been the lack of preliminary economic assessment.  The 
supranational government, the European Union (EU) (comprising 28 countries 
with different monetary, fiscal and welfare policies) requires an impact analysis 
before regulating to evaluate the “potential economic, social and environmental 
impacts” (European Union, 2014a).  If conducted this would ensure that decision-
makers were fully informed and able to assess alternatives before considering 
implementing legislation, regulations and policies.   Unfortunately for the airline 
industry, the EU has not always adhered to its own policies.   As a result it has 
produced boondoggles which are often implemented without preliminary 
economic impact analysis (Ancell, 2017) or any post-implementation evaluation.   
This is exampled by two regulations which create previously unidentified (i.e. 
missing) airline markets i.e. the carriage of PRMs and compensation for delayed 
passengers.
63.2.1 Carriage of PRMs
When disabled passengers were once a small minority represented by just a 
few wheelchair travellers, many NMSGs were keen to ensure these citizens 
participated in barrier-free economic life.   NMSGs worldwide recognised that 
disabled travellers were a missing market and that the airlines would not 
provide for them on the same terms as able-bodied passengers unless they 
were mandated to do so.    Consequently, PRMs were protected by legislation 
in many jurisdictions.   In Europe PRMs are protected by Regulation EC 
1107/2006 “concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with 
reduced mobility when travelling by air” (European Union, 2006).  However, 
what was originally developed to support a small number of wheelchair 
passengers has now expanded to include ageing, obese, sick and unentitled 
PRMs claiming disability in order to be able to access the mandated and 
complimentary services.   These include transport to and from aircraft and 
carriage of PRMs’ mobility aids, some of which can weigh 175kg and require 
specialist packaging and separation in the cargo hold.   PRMs now include 
those travelling for surgical operations and other medical requirements (often 
reimbursed by the NHS).  Included in their treatments are organ transplants, 
bariatric surgery, orthopaedic replacement of assorted body joints (Hanefeld 
et al., 2013; Lunt et al., 2013) and reproductive travel (Culley et al., 2013) 
which could result in multiple pregnancies (McKelvey et al., 2009) placing the 
mother and babies at high risk with the potential for flight diversion. The 
requirements from these passenger groups place an economic burden on the 
air carrier with the risk of aircraft diversion, disruption and delay (Ancell, 
2017).    No economic impact assessment was conducted before social 
regulation EC 1107/2006 was implemented and the costs are only now being 
assessed as increasing numbers of PRMs travel for life saving and enhancing 
treatments as well as leisure (Ancell and Graham, 2016; Ancell, 2017).    
Perversely, airlines’ costs incurred assisting NHS patients are an uncalculated 
hidden subsidy from private suppliers to assist the State.
3.2.2 Delayed passengers in Europe
Passengers delayed in Europe are now protected by another social regulation 
– EC 261/2004 (European Union, 2014b) – which established common rules on 
how airlines are required  to compensate passengers in the event of denied 
boarding, cancelled flights or long delays (European Union, 2004) unless 
circumstances were ‘extraordinary’ as defined by the EU.   ‘Extraordinary’ 
includes “political instability, meteorological conditions incompatible with the 
operation of the flight concerned, security risks unexpected flight safety 
shortcomings and strikes that affect the operation of an operating carrier” 
(ibid).    This social regulation means that passengers do not need to 
purchase travel insurance because other passengers will pay a surcharge to 
cover uninsured risks and compensation.  This increases uninsured 
passengers’ welfare and allows them a free ride – a socially detrimental 
outcome.
Both these regulations increase airlines’ costs and passengers’ prices.  
3.3 Externalities
Positive externalities in aviation include the speed of international shipping of 
time-sensitive goods and potential for tourism with all its opportunities to 
increase employment and national prosperity (Ancell, 2017).  The reduced travel 
costs resulting from increased competition have opened new regions.  They have 
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widening labour markets), inward investment, consumers’ mobility, business 
connectivity and travel, and expanded market opportunities (Williams and Baláz, 
2009).    Further positive externalities are derived from the opening of 
completely new (formerly missing) markets including those for healthcare such 
as fly-to-dentists (Williams and Baláz, 2009) all of which increase national 
prosperity as they innovatively expand trade.
Unfortunately, aviation also has negative externalities which are often the 
subject of government intervention to regulate, issue permits, apply quotas or 
decree eligible for ‘sin’ taxes.    Two of the most recognised are congestion and 
delay.  They affect the entire aviation supply chain.  At airports they might limit 
airline growth which in turn restricts revenues for the operators and authorities 
while increasing costs; business travellers can lose productivity; the tourist 
industry can lose inbound and outbound business; labour markets will provide 
fewer jobs; governments’ tax takes might be reduced and aircraft manufacturers 
could lose because of fewer orders (Janic, 1999).     
Solutions include Government intervention in the form of a ‘congestion tax’ i.e. 
“pricing by time of day or the length of a queue, or to restrict traffic and assign 
property rights by selling ownership of scarce landing slots at congested 
airports.” (Mayer and Sinai, 2002: 1).  
Negative aviation externalities also include pollution from aircraft noise and 
emissions (although aircraft are now much quieter and cleaner than previous 
generations).   Among the emissions is carbon dioxide (CO2) which some 
advocates claim is a pollutant and dangerous gas causing the Earth to overheat.  
They want CO2 production curtailed.  The supranational EU agrees and has 
created the EU Environmental Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2008) which anointed CO2 with property rights to enable trade.  All 
aircraft within the EU will have to trade CO2 emissions thus filling a formerly 
missing market.  These trades are actually a tax on aircraft which the EU would 
apply to climate adaptation projects in developing nations.  This would subsidise 
their social and environmental programmes and by reducing their national costs, 
affect the prices at which they could trade in international markets (such as 
aviation).   In contrast, developed nations have a multitude of social and 
environmental regulations which are absent in the developing world – costs 
which have to be recovered from prices.  In international markets, developed 
world carriers are often at a competitive disadvantage because of these costs 
which could eventually undermine their international competitiveness. 1
Negative airline externalities are also derived from accidents (on the ground and 
in the air) for which the main causes are “hazardous weather, ‘human’ errors, 
mechanical failures, sabotages and military actions” (Janic, 1999: 174).  
Many NMSG interventions to overcome negative externalities have made air 
travel safer (by reducing accidents) but others have made it more expensive for 
consumers as well as threatening the competitiveness of international aviation.  
3.4 Free riders
There are many examples of free ridership in aviation caused by regulations 
through which the NMSGs have deflected some of their social costs.  The 
1 since this paper was first written, EU ETS implementation has been suspended pending the United Nations’ finalising of its 
own programme – the Carbon Offset Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA)
8compassionate regulations for PRMs have created an economic problem.  EU 
Regulation EC 1107/2006 (see ‘2.2 Missing markets’) enables those who claim to 
have a disability to access the provisions such as complimentary buggy ride to 
the gate, swift clearance through Security, Customs and Immigration plus the 
free carriage of their equipment and (supposed) service animals.  They are able 
to access these services because airlines are unable to challenge self-declared 
PRMs' requirements.   Any unentitled ‘PRM’ increases his/her personal welfare at 
the expense of the airlines’ stakeholders – its shareholders (receiving lower 
dividends), employees (earning smaller rewards) and passengers (paying 
increased prices) (Ancell and Graham, 2016). i.e. PRM provisions can become a 
free ride for unentitled (self-declared) PRMs.   Since markets underprovide when 
free ridership is present, many entitled PRMs complain they have had to wait for 
the service to which they are entitled owing to the numbers of unentitled PRMs 
using the complimentary, regulated provisions (Airport Operators Association, 
2009).
European Regulation EC 261/2004 established common rules on airline 
compensation for passengers who might have been denied boarding, whose 
flights were cancelled or who suffered long delays (provided the events were not 
considered ‘extraordinary’ i.e. external, unavoidable and unpredictable).  The EU 
definition of ‘extraordinary’ (European Union, 2004) (see ‘3.2.3 Delayed 
passengers in Europe) could damage the competitiveness of airlines operating in 
Europe by increasing their prices to cover any compensation.  In effect, this 
Regulation negates the responsibility for travel insurance by placing the burden 
of passengers’ travelling misfortunes onto the airlines to solve.      The airlines 
are therefore carrying additional risks.  Risk has to be mitigated and mitigation 
has a price.
Further free rider examples abound.  As well as unentitled passengers (who 
trigger additional PRM costs including the carriage of their ‘service’ animals), 
some NMSGs also take a free ride.   Airlines do not receive reimbursement for all 
the States’ requirements such as checking visas and passports, collecting 
passengers’ and other taxes as well as medical services for sick NHS patients 
whose travel needs are ultimately subsidised by the airlines.   It could be argued 
that this is a reasonable trade-off since airlines are able to purchase some 
materials (e.g. fuel) free of taxes under provisions in the Chicago Convention 
1944 (ICAO, n.d.) but that is a concession which applies to all airlines – not a few 
selective carriers. 
The presence of free riders is supported by the boondoggles and unfunded 
mandates placed upon the airline industry.  They increase costs 
disproportionately for carriers which inadvertently attract a higher numbers of 
free riders because of their superior customer servicing.
3.5 Government provision
Governments’ direct provision in airline services has reduced significantly since 
industry deregulation.   Many governments used airlines to equalise 
opportunities in society and instead of public provision, have mandated 
industries to provide (such as the airlines’ provisions for PRMs).     In contrast, 
many governments provide a permit system for ground transport users (local 
buses, railways and coaches – many of which are State-subsidised).  This enables 
welfare beneficiaries to access transport concessions.  Airlines are prevented 
from using the same filter system and in any event, to run a parallel scheme for 
international aviation would be prohibitively expensive.   In the meantime, 
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enabling services without reimbursement.  
However, many States still provide aviation services such as Immigration, 
Emigration, Customs and Police recognising that these are public services.    
Other States require airlines to check passports and visas and quiz passengers 
with the security questions – actions which subsidise the State provision and for 
which no reimbursement is paid.   However, if airlines make an error such as 
allowing an incorrect visa to pass, fines are likely to follow (such as under the 
UK’s Carriers’ Liability Regulations 2002).  Airlines also subsidise the UK NHS (a 
government provision) by transporting patients (on publicly-funded journeys) 
who need additional privately-provided assistance such as wheelchair pushes 
and complimentary carriage of mobility equipment (see 3.2.1).  These are direct 
costs which are unrecoverable from the passengers who incur them.  They are 
covered by either a surcharge on other passengers or by reducing shareholders’ 
dividends and/or employees’ rewards.   
Aviation security is a necessary, expensive public good (non-rivalrous and non-
excludable) often provided privately and which can lead to congestion, delays 
and inefficiencies.  “No person can be excluded from the security… and no 
person’s enjoyment of this protection weakens that of another person’s 
protection.” (Prentice, 2015: 55).   The benefits of airport security may also 
extend to non-travellers and their families occupying high-rise buildings and 
anyone who occupies a structure which could become a terrorist target (i.e. 
effectively free-riders).    Other forms of transport do not have either the same 
security restrictions or costs as aviation.  Effective security is a positive 
externality which will also reduce theft, drug smuggling, human trafficking and 
tariff evasion and will facilitate trade and allow monitoring of export controls 
(Prentice, 2015).   
State provision of airport security is inconsistent.   Mexico, for example, 
recognises aviation security as a public good and does not impose taxes on 
passengers to pay for it (Prentice, 2015).  Mexican airport security is funded out 
of general revenues and since they are government-owned and operated they 
are paid by the airport administrations (ibid). In contrast, in Canada, the 
Government has privatised the provision of a public good (ibid).  Airport and 
police security responsibility was shifted to the Canadian Airport Authorities until 
2002 when it was commercialised and became, in effect, another tax on an 
airline ticket.    The increased costs gives Canadian travellers a reason to cross 
into the USA where they can fly from less expensive airports.  This is an 
intervention in the airline passenger market which is detrimental to Canadian 
carriers.   That presages a loss of other economic benefits such as cross-border 
shopping.   Canadian airport costs are largely fixed (such as parking fees, landing 
fees and concession rents) but the revenues are variable and dependant on the 
number of passengers flying.  Reduced passenger numbers means those who are 
flying have to pay more thereby triggering a demand for passengers to drive 
across the border into the USA rather than fly.  Overall it produces a reduction in 
real tax revenues.    Furthermore, “…through its sovereign powers the 
Government of Canada has become an air transport security free-rider.” (ibid: 
58).   
In the USA, airlines conducted the public screening at their own expense and 
subcontract the work to private security firms.  This, however, was considered a 
weakness after the 2001 terrorist activities and the provision was transferred to 
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public control using government employees.   Funding was a mix of public and 
private revenues (ibid).   Many of the security costs are now considered 
disproportionate to the threat but because hard-screening systems are in place, 
dismantling them worldwide will prove problematical since aviation security is an 
expensive business interwoven into the travel experience.    The USA 
Transportation Security Agency (TSA) has approximately 60,000 employees and 
an annual budget of $7.4bn (TSA, 2016).  There is considered to be much wasted 
expenditure with such security arrangements.   Risk has a price and the “political 
realities supply an understandable excuse for expending money, but not a valid 
one. In particular, they do not relieve officials of the responsibility of seeking to 
expend public funds wisely” (Mueller and Stewart, 2011:  22).   Currently airlines 
pay in excess of $US8.55 billion annually for aviation and border security (IATA, 
2015).     
Aviation is a contributor to national economies but instead of making public 
provision, many governments treat private airlines’ services as public goods and 
tax them like a ‘sin’ (e.g. cigarettes).  Taxes imposed include departure, 
Immigration, Customs, animal and plant health, and emissions from airports and 
aircraft.  These all increase transactions, add to costs and therefore affect prices.  
“Aviation charges should be based on their real cost and not be used as a 
revenue generating activity for countries” (IATA, 2015: n.p.).   
NMSGs’ airline security requirements are aligned to protect the airline industry 
however inconsistencies in application and funding could eventually lead to 
excessive costs without any corresponding improved services.
3.6 Inequalities
Some members of society consume less than others because of lack of income 
and/or higher base expenditure.    Deregulation of the airline market has led to 
lower fares enabling more lower-income citizens to travel.  This democratisation 
of consumption reduces some of the social inequalities which can lead to some 
households consuming fewer goods and services (such as airline travel).    Many 
NMSGs legislate and regulate  “to bridge inequalities caused by age, disability, 
gender or gender reassignment, religion or belief, sexual orientation, race, 
culture, language, marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy, maternity and/or 
paternity,  intergenerational obligations, political persuasion or trade union 
membership” (Ancell, 2017).  To this list could also be added opportunities for 
consumption, income, education, health improvement and a host of other criteria 
by which citizens are unequal.    Governments attempt to equalise consumption 
in airline travel by applying higher taxes in premium cabins (HM Revenue and 
Customs, 2014) and enacting legislation such as EC 1107/2006 which enables 
consumption by entitled beneficiaries (and inadvertently, unentitled free riders), 
their service animals and complimentary carriage of  mobility equipment.    On 
the other hand, democratising consumption through the formation of no-frills, 
low-cost carriers has done much to equalise travel opportunities for lower-
earners in the population.   Some airlines offer reduced fares for specific socially 
or economically disadvantaged passenger groups (e.g. obese people are 
sometimes offered discounts for purchasing more than one seat). 
In airline terms, governments have acted to reduce social inequalities by 
implementing unfunded mandates for the carriage of elderly, sick, disabled or 
medical passengers – services which are ultimately paid by reduced rewards for 
shareholders and/or employees or higher fares for other passengers. 
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3.7 Moral panic
Perhaps the most obvious aviation moral panic supported by NMSG regulations is 
that of the purported threat posed by climate changing which has been partially 
attributed to the emissions from the fossil fuels which keep aircraft aloft.    The 
climate has always changed but a moral panic has convinced legislators that the 
current climate changes are anthropogenic and dangerous.  The advocates for 
this theory conclude that anthropogenic global warming (AGW) is harmful and 
have made the case for NMSG intervention in markets to restrict activities which 
emit CO2 or its warming equivalents (CO2e).  They claim that there is a causal 
link between CO2 concentrations and global temperature rise which, if more than 
2oC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 1995) will be the point 
where Earth will experience runaway warming.  This has never happened in 
millions of years although CO2 has been much higher than current readings (de 
Freitas, 2002).   The overheating theory has been given credence by the 
supranational United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC).    The IPCC mandate is to focus on "a change of climate which is 
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of 
the atmosphere, and which is in addition to natural climate variability.” (IPCC, 
2013: 1450). The assumption is that humankind is responsible for changes in the 
climate and provides justification for the IPCC’s founding despite the fact that 
humans might not be responsible for any warming (or even cooling) changes.    
Even the IPCC (1990: xii) has acknowledged the existence of natural climate 
warming: “Global-mean surface air temperature has increased by 0.3°C to 0.6°C 
over the last 100 years … These increases have not been smooth with time, nor 
uniform over the globe.   The size of this warming is broadly consistent with 
predictions of climate models, but it is also of the same magnitude as natural 
climate variability.   Thus the observed increase could be largely due to this 
natural variability…”.     In fact, the climate has warmed and cooled many times 
throughout many centuries the causes of which are unclear (de Freitas, 2002).    
Furthermore only some of the documents on which the IPCC bases its output are 
actually scientifically peer reviewed (Bell, 2015).
The IPCC relies heavily on computer models for its evidence and yet models are 
not evidence.  Furthermore, using the concept of “average temperature is 
meaningless … temperature only means something locally, because the 
thermodynamic conditions vary from point to point” (Essex and McKitrick, 2007: 
112).   Multiple computer models have convinced NMSGs that bi-products from 
industrial processes including aviation will be responsible for any damaging 
global warming.  There is however, no way to distinguish between anthropogenic 
or natural increases in either CO2 (Segalstad, 2009) or temperature (Tol, 2005), 
or to measure a ‘global’ temperature.  However, aside from CO2, the most potent 
atmospheric gas is water (H2O) in various forms i.e. clouds, rain, humidity and 
evaporation.    
Governments have a duty to protect human rights to life, liberty and happiness 
but “this duty must not be discharged by government regulation of market 
processes” (Dawson, 2011: 2).  This contrasts with Stern (2006) who, in writing 
the UK’s examination of the economics of climate change, argued that AGW-is-
harmful “is the greatest example of market failure we have ever seen.” (Stern, 
2006:1).  However, not all are in agreement and others argue that “it is not 
markets that have failed but governments … [and] far from being the greatest 
market failure, the AGW hypothesis may rather be the greatest moral panic the 
world has seen.” (Dawson, 2011: 2).   There is no scientific basis for current 
climate policies which include taxes levied on fossil fuel energy emissions and 
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the creation of markets for naturally occurring gases such as CO2.   Governments 
lack sufficient knowledge to operate effective climate policies and consequently 
“all existing climate policy instruments including taxes, subsidies, regulations 
and emissions trading should therefore be swept away” (ibid: 2).   In order to 
assuage the AGW-is-harmful proponents, NMSGs have acted on the 
precautionary principle “when there are reasonable grounds for concern that 
potential hazards may affect the environment or human, animal or plant health, 
and when at the same time the available data preclude a detailed risk 
evaluation, the precautionary basis has been politically accepted as a risk 
management strategy” (Commission of the European Communities, 2000: 8) 
(NB: “politically” accepted not “economically” accepted).   For as long as the 
scientific data is inconclusive and the risks remain unacceptable, the EU 
rationalises that the precautions must continue and yet the scientific data on 
which this relies is derived from computer modelling which has been proven to 
be unreliable until such time as the predicted events occur.   
NMSG’s spend heavily on pro-AGW climate research.  The US Government spent 
over $US185bn between 2003 and 2010 on climate change items (Bell, 2015) 
(Table 1).  Similarly, the EU has agreed that at least 20% of its budget for 2014 
to 2020 “as much as €180bn [£stg127bn or $US196bn] should be spent on 
climate change-related action.” (European Union, n.d.).   Furthermore, the EU 
intends to integrate mitigation and adaptations into “all major EU spending 
programmes, in particular cohesion policy, regional development, energy, 
transport, research and innovation and the Common Agricultural Policy.” 
(European Union, n.d.).      




Source of donation Value Source
1998 to 
2015
The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration 
(USA)
















2003-2010 US Government $US185 
billion
Bell (2015)






2014-2020 EU to spend 20% of its total 
budget on  climate projects 
€180 billion European Union 
(n.d.)
2014-2015 EU (to spend in developing 
countries – included in €180 
billion above)
€1.7 billion European Union 
(n.d.)
2015-2020 EU (to spend in developing 
countries)
€14 billion European Union 
(n.d.)
Policies should only be made on impartial, full information and data – and not 
reliant on computer modelling. The EU policies will be focussed on supporting 
“public authorities, NGOs and private actors, especially small and medium-sized 
enterprises, in implementing small-scale low-carbon and adaptation technologies 
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and new approaches and methodologies [sic].” (European Union, n.d.)2    The 
proposed spend in advancing countries for projects purported to prevent climate 
change will be approximately €1.7bn (£stg1.24bn or $US1.92bn) between 2014 
and 2015, and €14bn (£Stg10.25bn or $US15.84bn) between 2014 and 2020.  No 
equivalent NMSG funding is allocated to support contrary views to challenge the 
computer modelling.  Such significant and partisan investment, which can never 
be matched by private funds, stretches the precautionary principle.  The 
consequence for such funding imbalance (i.e. €14bn vs €0) is wasted taxpayers’ 
resources.
Despite the lack of evidence, this moral panic has spawned massive costs and 
many new formerly-missing industries to justify investment in prevention rather 
than the alternatives i.e. adaptive or mitigating measures.      “As for other major 
natural disasters [e.g. tsunami or earthquake], the appropriate preparation for 
extreme climate events is to mitigate and manage the negative effects when 
they occur, and especially so for dangerous coolings.  Attempting instead to 
‘stop climate change’ by reducing human carbon dioxide emissions is a costly 
exercise of utter futility.  Rational climate policies must be based on adaptation 
to dangerous change as and when it occurs, and irrespective of its sign or 
causation.” (Carter, 2007: 4).  The monies taken for energy taxes eventually 
become payments which are used to subsidise social and environmental 
programmes in advancing nations – many of which will have airlines with lower 
overheads owing to reduced social and labour costs.  Subsidising their nations in 
this way hampers a competitive international airline market and is tantamount to 
airlines in the advanced world subsidising their advancing world competitors.
The airlines’ response has been to instal various voluntary emissions offset 
schemes for passengers who wish to monetise the negative externality of their 
flight emissions.  However the take-up of these offers has been minimal at 
approximatly 3% of flyers (Kahya, 2009).  
Airlines’ costs of the NMSGs’ social and environmental regulations can only be 
met economically – either by reducing shareholders’ dividends or employees’ 
rewards, or by increasing prices for passengers and/or freight.  
4 CONCLUSION
Many of the NMSGs’ airline market interventions appear politically motivated and 
targeted at social or environmental causes rather than airline economic 
problems.  Furthermore, many would appear to have been implemented without 
considering the economic impact on airlines.   With the exception of opening the 
airline market to competition, NMSG interventions contribute to higher costs and 
customers’ prices.  Developing spurious missing markets, monetising negative 
externalities, requiring compulsory provisions, tolerating free riders and 
equalising inequalities all add to costs.   Furthermore, the international airline 
market could be distorted by payments to developing nations where their 
carriers could obtain an economic advantage by virtue of their already lower 
social and environmental costs.  This could trigger unfair international 
competition resulting in market inefficiency or even failure.  Airlines and their 
passengers benefit from fair competition with light touch economic 
2 ‘Methodology’ is the study of methods.
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regulation.     In order to keep the market functioning fairly, future NMSG 
interventions should be pre-empted by economic impact assessments followed 
by post implementation evaluations.  This would protect the aviation market 
from any unfair, anti-competitive regulations which could trigger inefficiencies or 
failures.
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